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Abstract: 
We discuss the role of practical costs in the epistemic justification of a novice choosing 
expert advice, taking as a case study the choice of an expert statistician by a lay 
politician. First, we refine Goldman’s criteria for the assessment of this choice, showing 
how the costs of not being impartial impinge on the epistemic justification of the 
different actors involved in the choice. Then, drawing on two case studies, we discuss in 
which institutional setting the costs of partiality can play an epistemic role. This way we 
intend to show how the sociological explanation of the choice of experts can incorporate 
its epistemic justification. 
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Choosing expert statistical advice: 
practical costs and epistemic justification 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Sometimes a policy maker has to make a decision on the basis of a statistical 
figure. Calculating this figure is usually beyond the ability of the policy maker and it is 
thus commissioned to an expert in an inferential technique. Often there will be more 
than one expert in a given technique or various experts in different statistical methods to 
calculate this figure. The epistemic problem in these situations is how the policy maker 
can remain a novice in statistics and yet make a justified judgment about the relative 
credibility of rival statistical experts.  
In this paper we will examine how practical facts – concerning both the expert 
and the novice – may affect the policy maker's decision and its justification. We will 
consider Alvin Goldman's criteria for the selection of experts, showing how practical 
costs impinge on the epistemic justification of such choices. We will argue first that, 
among Goldman’s criteria, the impartiality1 of the expert is the most influential one in 
determining whether the expert’s advice will be accepted: it does not only justify the 
choice, from a normative perspective, but it also (partially) explains why, as a matter of 
fact, certain statistical experts were chosen. The link between the individual interests 
driving this choice and its epistemic justification is provided by one practical fact: the 
costs of not being impartial (either for the expert or for the novice) are sometimes high 
enough to compel a choice and, at the same time, justify it. 
                                                      
1 We will consider the advice of an expert impartial if his recommendation (e.g., a statistical estimate) is 
independent from his own personal preferences or biases. Teira (2013a, 2013b) discusses how this 
independence can be actually warranted.  
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At the same time, drawing on two case studies on the actual choice of statistical 
experts, we will examine under which institutional circumstances the costs of partiality 
drive the policy-maker’s decision. We want to show here an epistemically grounded 
agreement is possible, under certain circumstances, if all the concerned parties can 
appraise the costs of partiality in a similar manner, despite the differences in their 
respective contexts. In addition, we want to show that our approach allows a more 
charitable epistemic interpretation of the actual processes in which statistical experts are 
chosen than the current relativist standard among social scholars of science. Yet, we 
will also argue that impartiality has not the same traction in every institutional context 
and it is open to discussion whether some epistemic justification of the choice of an 
policy advisor is possible beyond our current democracies. 
In the following section we will briefly discuss the relevance of practical costs 
for epistemological analysis and we will present and refine Goldman’s criteria for a 
justified choice of experts by novices. In section 3, we will discuss in this perspective 
Ted Porter’s case study of the choice of the US Army Corps of Engineers as experts for 
the American administration in the early 20th century, showing how Goldman’s refined 
criteria can successfully deal with it. In section 4 Eric Brian’s analysis of the first 
population estimates in the pre-revolutionary France will illustrate that costs are not 
enough to appraise the impartiality of an expert's judgment in cases where the 
specification of the object of study is inevitably value-laden. In the final section we 
draw lessons from these case studies. 
2. Choosing experts in context 
 
The justification of the choice of an expert by a policy maker is just an instance 
of the type of problems addressed in the growing literature on the epistemology of 
expert judgment (Selinger and Crease 2006). The selection of statistical experts may not 
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have been a traditional concern for epistemologists, but sociologists and historians of 
science have documented and explained a number of such choices. Generally speaking, 
the choice of a statistical approach is explained as an exchange in which both the expert 
and the novice somehow satisfy their diverse interests. The traditional division between 
positive and normative inquiries usually applies here. Positive practical interests do not 
feature prominently in the epistemologist’s account of the novice’s choice. Normative 
epistemic considerations do not play a major role for most sociologists and historians in 
explaining this decision either. However, it is gradually acknowledged that the 
connection between justified knowledge and practical interests is perhaps closer than 
both parties previously acknowledged.  
Jason Stanley (2005, 3-5), for instance, lists a number of well-known cases in 
which we grant different degrees of justification to an epistemic agent depending on her 
practical circumstances. Given certain evidence, an agent may count as knowing 
something when the practical costs of being wrong are low for her, but not when her 
costs are high. Hence, knowledge would be connected to action through practical facts: 
something might count as justified knowledge for an agent (or not) depending on the 
cost of being right or wrong about one's beliefs. However, there are three different 
perspectives to appraise these practical facts: the standpoint of the agent who claims to 
know something; the standpoint of a second agent who attributes knowledge to the 
former; and finally the standpoint of a third agent who is considering this knowledge’s 
claim or attribution from her own perspective.   
Each of these three perspectives can be substantiated from an epistemic 
standpoint. Stanley, among others, claims that the relevant practical facts concern the 
subject to whom knowledge is being attributed –this view is known as subject-sensitive 
invariantism (Stanley 2005; Hawthorne 2004). On the contrary, contextualist authors 
argue that it is the practical context of the attributor –rather than the subject being 
attributed– what should be considered (DeRose, 1992, 1999; Cohen, 1988). In cases of 
self-attribution, these two positions merge, but they are clearly different in cases of 
third-person knowledge attributions. A further possibility is relativism (MacFarlane, 
2011), according to which the relevant epistemic standard is fixed by reference to the 
practical features of the context of evaluation. So, the standard for measuring the truth 
of an attribution of knowledge would depend on the practical interests and costs of 
whoever is assessing such attribution.  
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These three perspectives are crucial for our analysis. We should distinguish the 
practical facts regarding our statistical expert, those regarding our lay policy-maker and 
finally the practical facts concerning, for instance, the public bearing the consequences 
of the policy-maker’s choice. We will discuss the epistemic justification of a novice 
choosing an expert and we may wonder which practical facts are relevant for assessing 
this choice. But we need to adopt first some epistemic criteria for judging such choice, 
if that is possible. 
It has been argued indeed that this choice is epistemically blind: the novice does 
not have direct access to the relevant evidence and cannot understand the arguments that 
support the expert’s advice. However, a significant amount of our beliefs would be 
rendered ungrounded and scepticism about expert judgment would be inevitable. To 
prevent it, epistemologists such as Hardwig, Burge or Foley claim that there is some 
sort of prima facie justification to accept statements from experts (or testimonial 
knowledge in general), even if it creates a certain epistemic dependence on their 
knowledge. This may be a justification derived from the mere assertion of a claim by a 
speaker (Burge 1993) or a general epistemic right to trust others (Foley 1994). 
We side instead with Alvin Goldman who argues for separating the discussion of 
expert judgment from “foundational” issues about testimony and focus instead on 
empirical evidence that may justify a novice in believing a putative expert rather than 
another. Goldman (2001, 92) defines a cognitive or intellectual expert in the following 
manner: 
[A]n expert (in the strong sense) in domain D is someone who possesses an 
extensive fund of knowledge (true belief) and a set of skills or methods for apt 
and successful deployment of this knowledge to new questions in the domain. 
Anyone purporting to be a (cognitive) expert in a given domain will claim to 
have such a fund and set of methods, and will claim to have true answers to the 
question(s) under dispute because he has applied his fund and his methods to the 
question(s).  
Suppose a lay person finds herself in a situation where various experts claim to 
have different answer to a given question. Goldman claims she would be justified in 
choosing one if she grounds her choice in information extracted from these five 
empirical sources:    
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A) Arguments presented by the contending experts to support their own views 
and critique their rivals' views. 
(B) Agreement from additional putative experts on one side or other of the 
subject in question. 
(C) Appraisals by "meta-experts" of the experts' expertise (including appraisals 
reflected in formal credentials earned by the experts). 
(D) Evidence of the experts' interests and biases vis-a-vis the question at issue. 
(E) Evidence of the experts' past "track-records"  
In sum, the novice should check which expert argues better and who gets more 
(independent) support from other experts for either her claims or her status, then ponder 
this evidence with her track record in a particular domain and any possible conflict of 
interest that may bias her judgment. Even if Goldman does not explain how to aggregate 
the evidence from these five sources, the basic intuition seems plainly acceptable: a 
novice would be justified in accepting an expert’s claim if this expert scores highly in 
A, B, C and E and there is no evidence of him being biased. 
Goldman’s criteria allow for practical factors to play an indirect epistemic role, 
as indirect evidence about the justification of the expert’s views. When the novice has 
no direct access to the evidence backing the expert’s judgment, she will have to make a 
decision relying on facts about the reliability of the expert (for instance, information 
about the expert’s impartiality). Practical factors concerning the expert may be taken as 
evidence for or against her reliability and, therefore, as indirect evidence supporting or 
advising against the choice of that expert. On the other hand, it has been shown above 
that practical factors can also play a different role, by setting the contextually relevant 
epistemic standard for knowledge attributions. In this case, practical factors would not 
be providing evidence of any sort, but would rather contribute to determining what 
evidence is required in order to consider that someone knows something. Bear in mind 
that, depending on the semantic framework adopted, the relevant practical factors for 
setting this epistemic standard will be those concerning the subject of the attribution, the 
attributor or the evaluator. So, if we consider an attribution of knowledge to an expert 
made by a novice, a contextualist perspective will take into account the practical costs 
of the novice, while a relativist one will focus on the practical factors related to the 
evaluator of the attribution (which can be some third party, say, the general public).     
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In this paper, we want to examine how practical costs contribute in two case 
studies about lay policy-makers choosing statistical experts. Our goal is to discern how 
the actual practical costs for all the parties involved in the decision allow us to qualify 
Goldman’s criteria, on the one hand. And, on the other hand, we will explore to what 
extent choices of these sort, contaminated by all kind of interests, can be deemed 
epistemically justified. 
3. Estimating costs and benefits of public works  
Ted Porter’s Trust in numbers (1995) is probably the current standard account of 
expert statistical judgment in the science studies community. Porter considers different 
scientific communities as professional bodies (or parts of them) that try to advance their 
joint interests in response to various social demands for expert advice. According to 
Porter, in Western democracies at the turn of the 20th century, it wasn’t possible for 
public officials to accept individual expert judgment on the sole basis of personal trust 
in the members of a scientific elite. The experts gradually became professional bodies 
whose advice was delivered complying “with impersonal rules and calculations in order 
to exclude bias and personal preferences”. The more social pressure for unified and 
accountable expert advice, the more likely it was that quantification succeeded among 
social scientists. According to Porter (1995, p. 8), this social pressure was expressed in 
normative terms: scientific objectivity answered to “a moral demand for impartiality 
and fairness” which arose in particular social settings. 
We will focus on the seventh chapter in Trust in numbers (Porter 1995, 148-190. 
Simplifying the argument for our purposes, it could be stated as follows: the policy 
makers are here the United States Congress and the experts are the Army engineers. The 
former seek a decision rule to authorise or not certain public works and the latter offer 
them an estimate: a cost-benefit analysis of each project. Other experts contested this 
estimate. Our question is thus to what extent were the policy makers justified in 
adopting the engineers’ estimate as a decision rule. Let us first put this process in 
context, before applying Goldman’s set of criteria to answer the question. 
The American Army Corps of Engineers are the experts. Unlike its French peers 
(the Corps des Ponts et Chaussées), this group of military engineers did not find itself 
“at the center of an administrative ruling class”: they were under constant political 
pressure to deliver reports about the viability of public works that met the Congress 
(positive or negative) expectations. According to Porter, quantification grew up here “as 
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an attempt to create a basis for mutual accommodation in a context of suspicion and 
disagreement”. Cost-benefit analysis, claims Porter, was developed as a quantitative 
procedure to select water projects in a context of conflict between various government 
agencies and utility companies.  
After 1902, water projects needed to be certified as beneficial by a Board of 
Engineers for Rivers and Harbors that was established within the Corps. The Board 
rejected more than half of the projects submitted, judging many as economically 
unfeasible. By the 1920s approval formally required that the benefits of the project 
exceeded its costs. With a reputation for rigor, the Corps’ estimates went undisputed 
through the 1930s. After the 1936 Flood Control Act, the American Congress could 
only authorise publicly subsidised navigation and flood control works if there was a 
preliminary report of the Corps certifying that their benefits exceeded their costs. The 
cost benefit ratio was usually undisputed and the integrity of the Army engineers was 
publicly praised. As a matter of fact, the Corps did not owe its reputation to Congress 
patronage, but to their performance throughout a century of war, claims Porter. 
However, in exceptional cases the cost benefit ratio could be turned positive if 
intangible benefits were quantified and added up.  
A battle for these exceptions was fought over the 1940s. The Corps faced 
utilities and railroad companies, on the one hand, and a couple of government agencies, 
on the other. The former defended their financial interests challenging the accuracy and 
impartiality of the Corps estimates. The latter advocated diverging methods to estimate 
the cost-benefit ratios of dams – those who were losing their properties with the dams 
found these alternative estimates more favourable to their interests. This opposition led 
to tighter quantification rules, which were partly relaxed and partly strengthened again 
in the coming decades, until economists came to replace engineers in the 1960s. Their 
theoretical approach encompassed “an ever more diverse and recalcitrant array of 
benefits” that the standard methods could not handle (Porter 1995, 187). 
Porter does not analyse a single Congress decision, but rather illustrates with 
various cases the interaction between experts and policy-makers. We cannot assess the 
epistemic justification of a given expert judgment adopted by a majority in the 
Congress. We can only presume certain uniformity in the interaction pattern in all these 
cases during the period analysed by Porter (roughly 1920-1950) and see to what extent 
there are elements that might have partially justified the policy makers in each particular 
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one. Let us seek evidence about Goldman’s criteria in Porter’s discussion. We will see 
later how to add them up. 
(A) Arguments presented by the contending experts to support their own views and 
critique their rivals' views 
Confrontation of the Corps estimates must have not taken place until late after its 
creation, if we accept Senator Guy Cordon’s remark (on the occasion of a 1946 Senate 
hearing on a canal in Louisiana and Arkansas): “this is the first time I have had 
experience with opponents coming in and controverting facts and making their 
allegation specific” (1995, 166). A Corps expert was called in to justify the report 
figures against the objections of the representatives of the Association of American 
Railroads. Porter gathers evidence that this happened again, at least whenever the 
opposition was strong enough and succeeded in substantiating their claims against the 
Corps analysis. Yet, concludes Porter, “it was evidently impossible to for private 
interests opposing particular projects to discredit its officially sanctioned numbers” 
(1995, 168) 
(B) Agreement from additional putative experts on one side or other of the subject in 
question 
Alternative expert estimates were occasionally delivered by other government 
agencies, e.g, the Soil Conservation Service of the Department of Agriculture. This 
Service promoted alternative policies for flood control, relying on land management 
rather than big dams. Its cost benefit methods were consequently less generous with big 
infrastructures and were preferred by those who considered their interests damaged by 
the Corps analyses. Following Porter’s narrative, all these groups of experts understood 
that the more unified their advice, the more trustworthy it would be for the policy maker 
and they soon joined efforts to develop unified cost benefit standards, with scarce 
success though. This took a toll on the Corps’ credibility in Congress in the early 1950s.   
(C) Appraisals by "meta-experts" of the experts' expertise (including appraisals 
reflected in formal credentials earned by the experts). 
The Corps engineers were recruited among the top graduates of the military 
academy at West Point, one of the most demanding higher education institutions in the 
country. The 1936 Flood Control Act required every project to be favourably informed 
by the Corps before it could be voted in Congress. The Corps engineers officially 
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became then “the chosen and recognized experts” upon flood control measures. Its 
expertise was the yardstick that measured everyone else’s competence in the country. 
 (D) Evidence of the experts' interests and biases vis-a-vis the question at issue 
Being a military unit, the Corps promoted an image of impartiality regarding 
partisan conflicts that was publicly acknowledged –Porter collects numerous 
testimonies in this respect (Porter 1995, 157). Even if their occasional adversaries 
challenged their impartiality in the assessment of particular project, the interests of these 
latter were often so obvious that, as Porter puts it, the accusation was self-defeating. 
Only claims backed up by a different government agency, as legitimately impartial as 
the Corps, had a chance to prosper. As the King River controversy analysed by Porter 
(1995, 169-175) illustrates, conflicts between such agencies could not be solved by 
quantitative estimations alone. 
 (E) Evidence of the experts' past "track-records" 
Porter gathers evidence that suggest that the past track record of the Corps was 
somehow invoked to justify the acceptance of their estimates. One nice example is a 
1946 hearing in which a hydraulic engineer had challenged the accuracy of the Corps’ 
analysis of the benefits of a particular dam with good empirical arguments. His case was 
dismissed: the committee was “entirely justified” in accepting the Corps estimation, 
given the many projects they had detected as unfeasible in the past. Though no formal 
track record of successful estimates had apparently been kept in Congress, the Corps 
had at least built a reputation of rigor that backed up their figures. 
We can conclude then that the members of the American Senate and Congress at 
least had enough empirical evidence to adopt the Corps’ expert judgment regarding the 
feasibility of the flood control and navigation projects submitted for approval. In 
principle, they could be epistemically justified in Goldman’s sense. But there is more to 
the analysis of Porter than just this evidence.   
“Cost benefit analysis was intended from the beginning as a strategy for limiting 
the play of politics in public investment decisions”, claims Porter (1995, 189). As an 
estimation technique, it just played an instrumental role in a bargaining process that 
Porter does not make explicit, but seems to go along the following lines. The American 
policy makers wanted the Army engineers to deliver an estimate of costs and benefits 
for public works. Yet they would only believe in estimates justified by general 
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principles in order to make decisions in Congress less conflictive. The engineers 
thought that a quantitative technique such as cost benefit analysis met this standard and 
delivered cost benefit figures. This bargaining process reveals interests regarding gains 
and losses in both politicians and experts. We read Porter as claiming that the American 
electorate wanted its legislators to decide with fairness and impartiality about water 
projects (we may assume they risked their seat if they did not comply). And we assume, 
by the same token, that the Army engineers wanted to be trusted by these legislators and 
the American electorate (at the cost of losing their status of experts, whatever the 
benefits were). This moral pressure on experts and policy makers led somehow to 
numerical estimates.  
Maybe alternative explanations of this case are possible, but they are not 
currently available. For the sake of our argument, we will adopt Porter’s at face value: it 
simply reveals that in adopting the Corps’ view, there was a cost to pay for the 
American policy-makers if their electorate perceived these estimates as partial or unfair. 
This cost was equally perceptible for the agents concerned (the politicians) and by a 
third party analysing the case (such as Porter). The interesting point is that these costs 
contribute to explain (from a sociological standpoint) and justify (epistemically) the 
choice of our lay politicians: the estimate had to be numerical.  
We can interpret this preference for numbers as compliance with Goldman’s 
requisite (D): numerical estimates provide a warrant about the impartiality of the advice. 
But Porter’s account suggests something deeper: the American policy-makers had to 
pay a penalty for not choosing impartial experts, since their constituencies cared more 
about criterion D than about the other four. Or, at least, Porter did not mention an 
explicit price to pay for the policy-makers if they did not consider the quality of the 
engineer’s arguments, their credentials or their past track-record. The assessment of the 
expert’s impartiality is thus the channel through which the practical costs impinge on 
the epistemic justification of the novice. 
This can be immediately interpreted from a contextualist perspective: the costs 
for the novice of not choosing an impartial expert raise the epistemic standard of the 
choice. And we can restate Goldman’s D clause as follows: 
[D’] The higher the cost for the policy maker of not adopting impartial expert 
judgment, the more demanding her epistemic standards for the attribution of 
knowledge to the expert will be. 
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Moreover, the novice policy-maker can judge how impartial an expert is 
according to the same principle: the Army engineers were competing with other experts 
for the attention of the Congress and presumably they would suffer some costs for 
losing it. Hence, the policy-maker can also measure the impartiality of her statistical 
expert for the costs this latter would pay for her biases. In other words, the novice can 
appraise how justified is the expert in delivering a particular piece of advice considering 
the practical facts (costs) impinging on it. Hence we should add a proviso to Goldman’s 
clause: 
[D’’] The higher the cost for the expert of not providing impartial judgment, the 
more justified the policy-maker's choice of expert will be regarding [D’]. 
 It is interesting to notice that in this particular case, as analysed by Porter, there 
is a convergence in the practical interests of the three relevant perspectives: the expert, 
the novice and the public should appraise each other’s costs in the same terms in order 
to reach an agreement. The Corps engineers offered numerical estimates because they 
perceived the public pressure on the politicians for such impartial figures and there was 
a cost for the Corps if they failed to deliver them. The public pressure, on the other 
hand, creates costs for the policy-maker which impel her to raise the level of 
justification in accepting the Engineer’s advice, and in particular to make sure of the 
Engineer’s impartiality; and a good measure of this impartiality is how big the costs of 
not delivering impartial advice would be for the Corps. Finally, a third party, the 
American public, would surely appraise the costs of both the Engineers and the 
politicians in order to judge their impartiality – after all, the public’s interest in an 
impartial choice of expert is the source of these costs. 
We think this coincidence on the epistemic assessment of the expert’s advice is 
important to provide an alternative interpretation to Porter’s account. For him, the 
process would be epistemically blind to the extent that neither the lay politicians nor the 
public could grasp the statistical foundations of the experts’ advice. Impartiality would 
be mostly an appearance since, as we just saw, all the involved parties had interests at 
stake. Yet, if we adopt Goldman’s approach with the modifications suggested, we may 
appraise first the epistemic role of impartiality in justifying the choice of the expert. The 
incorporation of practical costs via D’ and D’’ allows us to understand the connection 
between the private interests of the agents and their epistemic justification. For experts 
and politicians alike, it was in their own interest to be as impartial as possible, because 
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this is how they would be judged (and eventually punished). The adoption of statistical 
methods for public policy-making would be, in this respect, more epistemically justified 
than Porter’s own account suggests. But, as we are going to see in our next case study, it 
can also happen otherwise. 
4. Estimating the French population 
The second sociological approach to statistical expert judgment we will discuss 
is presented in Eric Brian’s La mesure de l’Etat. Administrateurs et géomètres au 
XVIIIe siècle. Brian analyses here the exchange between French mathematicians and 
policy makers in the Parisian Academy of Sciences between 1774 and 1789. The policy 
makers (namely represented by the enlightened economist Turgot, Head of the French 
Ministry of Finance between 1774 and 1776) sought a scientific estimation of the 
French population that could be used in the administrative reforms they were 
undertaking in order to improve the public finances. At the same time, a group of 
“geometers” in the Academy, led by Condorcet, its perpetual secretary and a friend of 
Turgot, were trying to promote the application of mathematical analysis to social 
phenomena, beyond its traditional realm. These mathematicians easily found external 
support in the policy makers in order to reform the scientific organization of the 
Academy. In exchange they provided new statistical tools to model the French 
population according to the new administrative categories these politicians were trying 
to implement. 
Brian analyses this exchange inspired by Pierre Bourdieu’s sociology of science.  
In his analysis, the political interests of the French administrators are not taken to be 
constraining unilaterally the choices of the mathematicians. It is admitted that their 
interests as a group within the Academy of Sciences are pursued autonomously. As a 
matter of fact, the language of interests is altogether avoided: for Bourdieu, both 
mathematicians and policy makers act following more behavioral dispositions (habitus) 
than beliefs and desires. Rather than tracing back to their psychological origins the 
motivations of these French geometers, Brian reconstructs their philosophical and 
practical understanding of mathematical analysis and focuses on their efforts to 
implement these views in the Academy. 
Hence, according to Brian, in order to explain Condorcet’s actions we should 
understand how he merged three different doctrines. He took from D’Alembert a 
metaphysical view of calculus that allowed its application to whatever domain. From 
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Turgot, Condorcet took not only epistemological ideas (about the analysis of the social 
order), but also practical guidance about how to implement some of them to the 
governance of France. Condorcet finally learnt from Laplace how to ground 
probabilities on integral analysis and apply them to infinite domains. Condorcet 
combined all these ideas in a way that put him in the position to understand what sort of 
figure the policy makers were after. He then pushed his colleagues at the Academy to 
use the surveys commissioned by the Ministry of Finance and deliver an estimate for 
the French population. This was the Essai pour connaître la population du royaume, 
published in 1783-1788 in the memoires (reports) series of the Academy. It compiled 
the figures gathered by La Michodière, another French administrator, together with the 
analytical papers of the three featuring co-authors of the memoir: Condorcet, Laplace 
and Dionis de Sejour. 
The official support for the project allowed Condorcet to reorganize the 
Academy in conformity with these ideas. In return, the Academy invested La 
Michodière’s figures with scientific authority. The French enlightened opinion around 
1780s was apparently more inclined to believe population estimates with the scientific 
endorsement of the Academy than as mere administrative calculations (Brian 1994,192). 
The publication of the Essay completed the transaction between geometers and 
administrators. However, the outburst of the Revolution aborted this blooming 
collaboration.  
We can pose again the question of whether the French policy-makers were 
epistemically justified in accepting the Academy’s estimate. Brian compiles good 
evidence to feed Goldman’s criteria. Let us examine first evidence for debate among 
experts on the estimate (criterion A). Following Brian’s analysis of the process, we 
should notice that the Ministry of Finance did not choose among various estimates of 
the French population, but rather commissioned one to the Academy, relying 
exclusively on its scientific authority.  Yet, still according to Brian, an alternative 
estimate provided by the former finance minister Jacques Necker had prompted the 
allegiance between the Academy and the Ministry of finance. In the Essay there are 
indeed criticisms of the use Necker made of the Ministry surveys in his 1784 De 
l’administration des finances de la France (Brian 1994, 272). However, the French 
public sided with Necker treatise and ignored the Academy report, even if the 
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divergence between their figures wasn’t huge. It was considered politically suspect, 
claims Brian, too close to the interests of the Monarchy, despite its scientific authority. 
Brian is quite explicit about the monopoly on scientific authority that the 
Academy exerted in France at that time. In this respect, the scientific credentials of 
Condorcet and his co-authors could not appear higher (criterion C). Their track record 
as statistical experts, if we measure it, for their publications in the memoires series (they 
had not issued estimates for social variables before) seems equally positive (criterion E).  
However, despite the scientific authority of the Academy’s estimate, the support 
received from the Ministry of Finance apparently deprived it of any public credibility –
warns Brian. A Monarchy sponsored estimate seemed politically loaded and, as a matter 
of fact, when additional experts issued alternative figures soon afterwards (Brion de La 
Tour, the Chevalier des Pommelles), they were inspired more by Necker’s criteria than 
by the Academy. Criterion B (additional experts) speaks against the epistemic 
justification of the admistrator’s choice of statistical advice. 
But what about the experts’ impartiality (D)? It is interesting to notice how, in 
Brian’s Bourdieusian approach, the members of the Academy act in their best scientific 
interest: they did not compromise on the quality of the estimate in order to satisfy any 
practical interests. However, even if the French administrators could considered their 
experts unbiased (as criterion D requires), the adverse reaction of the French public 
suggests that their population estimate, as such, was not considered impartial. The 
choice of an expert by the French administrators might appear somewhat epistemically 
justified, from Goldman’s standpoint –after all, it met criteria C, D and E. Yet, the issue 
at stake was the impartiality of the estimate itself: it seemed too dependent on the 
interests of the administrators who had commissioned it. This is Brian’s more radical 
point: the object to which the Academy’s statistical tools were applied, the French 
population, did not pre-exist, but was somehow constructed in the exchange between 
scientists and administrators.  
There were different sets of administrative divisions of the territory (political or 
geographical), depending on the purposes of each administration. On this basis, 
different sets of figures were compiled. The Academy chose one particular compilation, 
La Michodière’s, in order to aggregate these figures into an estimate for the population 
of the country. This aggregation implied, in turn, accepting a new mathematical 
technique of integration developed by Laplace, together with a philosophical rationale 
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justifying its application to social phenomena (developed by Condorcet). The Academy 
estimate of the French population implied thus the expert sanction of a political set of 
figures (as apt for scientific purposes) and the lay political support to a particular view 
of mathematical analysis (as the more adequate approach to deliver the estimate). The 
estimate was somehow conditional on this mutual agreement, brokered through the 
personal connections of Condorcet in the Academy and the Ministry.  
Therefore, the choice of an impartial statistical expert does not need to make the 
estimate impartial: the members of the Academy perhaps had no personal preferences 
regarding the issue at stake, but their estimate is certainly contaminated by the 
preferences of the sponsor, since the available data depended on a number of previous 
political choices. Goldman’s criteria assume a world in which a lay jury ponders the 
merits of the different expert views on an issue that is somehow external to expert or lay 
intervention. Its relevant features do not depend on their practical interests.  But in the 
Bourdieusian picture drawn by Brian, a group of scientists and a group of administrators 
trade on how to analyse the French population and every possible judgment about it 
would be inevitably value-laden, even if the statistical technique applied is, as such, 
neutral: there was no independent access to the French population and the figures 
compiled depended on an array of politically loaded decisions. 
Moreover, the practical costs do not qualify impartiality as they did in our 
previous case study. On the one hand, Brian’s approach does not explicitly consider 
costs, mostly because the agents are not acting according to their beliefs and desires, but 
rather, as we already suggested, on their behavioral dispositions (or habitus in 
Bourdieu’s terms). Hence, their impartiality cannot be qualified by practical facts: either 
they have it or they don’t. As the case under discussion illustrates, their subjective 
attitude would not count much: it would have been the partiality of the estimate, and not 
the estimator’s fairness, what caused the protests. However, leaving Brian’s own 
perspective aside, it is interesting to notice, that institutionally speaking, the decisions of 
experts and policy-makers alike were relatively cost-free: the Academy had no 
competition and the French administrators were not publicly elected.  
This case illustrates thus how the institutional constrains guiding the choice of 
experts by lay politicians may impact on its epistemic justification. In a regime where 
impartiality is not a pre-requisite for governance, Goldman’s four other criteria do not 
seem to have the social traction that allows us to connect individual interests with 
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epistemic choices. We cannot tell though whether this is just a peculiar feature of this 
case study or a more general problem. 
6. Concluding remarks 
With this exploration of the epistemic role of practical costs in the choice of 
experts, we have tried to bring together the fields of social epistemology and historical 
sociology of science. On the one hand, we have tried to refine Goldman’s criteria for the 
epistemic justification of novice’s choosing experts with the inclusion of practical costs, 
showing how these latter can qualify such justification through the assessment of the 
expert’s impartiality. On the other hand, drawing on two sociological analysis of the 
choice of a statistical expert, we have shown first how impartiality seems to be the 
epistemic criterion with more social traction (among Goldman’s five); and then how its 
relevance crucially depends on the institutional setting where the choice of the expert 
takes place.  
In an American democracy, it is possible to epistemically ground an agreement 
to the extent that there are individual costs for all the parties involved. In this respect, 
against Porter, we think that the adoption of statistical methods for public policy-
making is epistemically more defensible than most social students of science contend. 
However, if the institutional setting is an absolutist monarchy, with little completion 
other than for the king’s favor, impartiality loses traction since there is probably little to 
gain for being fair. Moreover, if there is no independent access to the subject of the 
expert’s advice, his own impartiality will not be enough to guarantee the impartiality of 
his advice.  
Two case studies do not provide a conclusive argument. But we think they at 
least suggest that the social epistemology of the choice of experts (beyond statistics) can 
fruitfully explore how practical costs impinge on justification via the impartiality of the 
experts and policy-makers alike. This approach can also help historians and sociologists 
to reconsider their own implicit epistemic premises and perhaps appreciate that 
sometimes the adoption of scientific methods is more epistemically grounded than it 
may seem at first. 
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